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PREFACE 
The courts of America are an institution of paradox. On the one 
hand, they are intimately involved in the daily affairs of the people, 
yet on the other, they carry out their duties largely behind a veil of 
public ignorance. Few outside the legal profession even pretend to 
understand the intricacies of the judicial process; jurisprudence is 
as mystical a subject as the general public can imagine. "Thus it 
happens," as Henry Home wrote in the eighteenth century, "that 
the knowledge of the law, like the mysteries of some Pagan Deity, 
is confined to its votaries; as if others were in duty bound to blind 
and implicit submission." 
The purpose of this book is to pull back that veil and to reveal 
the mysteries for what they are: ordinary institutional contrivances 
designed to shape and direct the politics of the nation. AB a result, 
the judicial process is inevitably a forum wherein differing visions 
of the just society come into conflict. While the cases and contro-
versies that come before the courts are contests between two rea-
sonably well defined adverse litigants, each with a personal stake in 
the resolution of the dispute, the judgments handed down often 
far beyond those litigants and affect American society and poli-
in the broadest sense. 
When Jane Roe sued to have the right to abort an unwanted 
{etns it was a very personal matter; the result, however, was very 
public. American politics and law have been consumed with Roe v. 
ade ever since. 
When the motion picture industry endeavored to protect copy-
hts against easy duplication by video cassette recorders, the rea-
''\yas narrow in the sense of protecting the rights of individuals. 
·frsult, however, had an impact in nearly every living room in 
rjca. 
,e.I1 the California Coastal Commission sought to protect 
!;;3,ccess to beaches by easements against property owners, it 
ix 
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was trying to serve the public interest, not harm individual home-
owners. Yet those homeowners saw it differently: they sued that 
such a public policy unconstitutionally deprived them of their 
property without just compensation as reqllired by the 
Constitution. They won, thereby transforming public policy by as-
serting their rights in court. 
Similarly, when a little girl named Linda Brown sued the school 
board of Topeka, Kansas, four decades ago so that she could at-
tend the public school of her choice regardless of her race, the res-
olution of Brown v. Board of Education changed the face of 
American society. 
The examples can be multiplied without end-from the death 
penalty, to rights of parental visitation, to police procedure, to 
school assignments. The fact is, judicial decisions shape public pol-
icy. But they do more: They also define public understanding not 
only as to the nature and extent of judicial power, but concerning 
the substantive issues oflaw and public policy as well. 
Since the beginning of the American republic, the courts have 
been the scene where the great public tugs-of-war have taken 
place. The question of whether Congress had the power to estab-
lish a national bank that so divided the Federalists and the 
Jeffersonians; the question of slavery that nearly shattered the 
union; the advent of economic liberalism and the progressive ef-
forts to tame the social aftereffects of the industrial revolution; the 
Great Depression and FDR's New Deal; and, of course, the civil 
rights movement of the 1960s all had their days in court. 
To suggest that courts are political bodies is not to disparage 
them; they are political bodies in the highest sense of the word. 
They are institutions designed to maintain the rule of law; without 
them, as Alexander Hamilton once put it, "the laws are a dead let-
ter." Thus what courts do-and how they do it-is of primary im-
portance to the political health of the nation. 
The great French commentator on America, Alexis de 
Tocqueville, once noted that in a very important sense, the courts 
are essential to the maintenance of the idea that law transcends the 
passions and the politics of the moment; the courts in America, 
Tocqueville sagely observed, wield enormous power, but it is a 
power derived only from their "moral force." AB Hamilton said in 
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The Federalist, the judges neither brandish the sword nor control 
the purse strings of the nation; their power is the power of disin-
terested judgment. For the courts to work as planned, they must 
have the political respect of the people; without it, their power will 
vanish. 
In recent years, the courts have tottered ever nearer the abyss of 
public disrespect. The courts have become not merely arenas 
where concrete cases and controversies (albeit with social implica-
tions) are decided but places where abstract legal theories are 
pushed by this side and that. Through the judicial process has 
come, as Judge Robert Bork so tellingly described it, a battle for 
the legal culture of America. 
Through the cases brought, the briefs filed, and the arguments 
made, ideological plaintiffs have endeavored to supplant the status 
quo with new visions of the just society. While the individual ad-
verse litigant is still necessary as a threshold matter to get into 
court, once there individual considerations all too often fade into 
insignificance. The cause becomes more important than the case. 
The goal is to replace a concern for concrete constitutional rights 
with a concern for judicially decreed constitutional values. As one 
lawyer has observed, this new emphasis on "public law litigation" 
is intended to reflect "doubt as to whether the status quo is in fact 
just." The object is simple: "The goal of this new mode of litiga-
tion is the creation of a new status quo." 
The average person may well wonder why the courts and not 
the legislatures for so tough a task. The answer is that to the advo-
cates of this new regime the people cannot be trusted; popular 
government is to be supplanted by judicial decree as shaped and 
::>directed by scholarly legal theories. In this view, the role of the 
<;.ourts has to be more than merely resolving disputes; the proper 
<tole is one that will give vent to what one writer has called the 
.~os of the polity. Old fashioned sorts might think this "ethos" 
..,9,ttld have some connection with popular judgments of right and 
!:>ng, justice and injustice. Not so: "the expressive function of 
• •:Court ... must sometimes be in advance of and even in con-
~o, the largely inchoate notions of the people generally." As 
.~rent dean of Stanford Law School once put it, the contem-
.theories of law pouring from the law schools are in truth 
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"advocacy scholarship-amicus briefs designed to persuade the 
court to adopt our various notions of the public good." 
What informs this new constitutional moralism is an intended 
blurring of the question of legality and the question of justice. 
The litigation strategies employed are all designed to show that, in 
the words of one famous Federal judge, there need be "no theo-
retical gulf between law and morality." By infusing law with moral 
theory, the average judge can be expected to practice what the 
legal theorists preach. Politically, however, the price is high. With 
judges unable to give an account of their decisions except to say 
that they are based on what the judge thinks just, without any 
clear textual warrant for such a view, it has become increasingly 
clear that the courts have begun to behave as political institutions 
not in the highest but in the lowest sense of the word. 
While the legal moralists have gained control of much of the 
law over the past thirty years or so, they carried out their program 
largely shielded from public view by what Henry Home called "a 
cloud of obscure words, and terms of art, a language perfectly un-
known, except to those of the profession.'' Shielded, that is, until 
Ronald Reagan undertook to change things during his two terms 
in the White House. Weary of judicial activism, Reagan promised 
the people to appoint judges "who would act like judges, and not 
like a bunch of sociology majors." The result was a political battle 
of the first order, reaching its bloodiest skirmish in the nomination 
of Robert H. Bork to the Supreme Court in 1987. The Bork 
nomination changed, probably forever, the way the American peo-
ple view the nature and extent of judicial power in American poli-
tics. 
Yet still the public understanding of the courts and their role 
under the Constitution remains more confused than clear. The 
goal of this book is to correct that situation. 
This book is designed to examine the nature and extent of judi-
cial power in the United States. It is meant to introduce the non-
technical reader to the intricacies of the judicial process: the 
structure and organization of the courts; the important implica-
tions-and politics-of judicial selection; the impact the proce-
dures of the courts have on the substantive outcomes of litigation; 
and especially the intimate relationship between the rule of men 
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·the public good." 
ma! moralism is an intended 
and the question of justice. 
: all designed to show that, in 
lge, there need be "no theo-
,, By infusing law with moral 
:pected to practice what the 
vever, the price is high. With 
their decisions except to say 
:ige thinks just, without any 
r, it has become increasingly 
1ehave as political institutions 
:nse of the word. 
.ned control of much of the 
iey carried out their program 
what Henry Home called "a 
' art, a language perfectly un-
sion." Shielded, that is, until 
things during his two terms 
al activism, Reagan promised 
•ould act like judges, and not 
ie result was a political battle 
st skirmish in the nomination 
: Court in 1987. The Bork 
r, the way the American peo-
icial power in American poli-
of the courts and their role 
re confused than clear. The 
1ation. 
he nature and extent of judi-
meant to introduce the non-
of the judicial process: the 
mrts; the important implica-
:tion; the impact the proce-
antive outcomes of litigation; 
tip between the rule of men 
Preface xiii 
and the rule of law. Taken together, these various areas reveal a 
marked movement in our courts away from what one might call 
principled judicial decision making toward a more pragmatic ap-
proach. Rather than deciding cases on the basis of concrete princi-
ples understood as neutrally transcending the case at hand, the 
contemporary judge all too frequently opts for attempting to indi-
vidualize justice for the case before him. Moral subjectivity all too 
often nudges legal objectivity out of the way. 
In order to achieve its goal of exposing and explaining the cur-
rent state of judicial power, the book begins with an analysis of a 
case called DeShanney v. Winnebago County. In this case, stem-
ming from the awful crime of child abuse, one can see in micro-
cosm all of the important aspects of judicial power-the effect of 
personnel on the direction of the law; the demands placed on 
judges by a written Constitution; the relationship between proce-
dure and substance the distinction between the private law of tort 
at the state level and the public law of the Constitution at the na-
tional level; certain aspects of American civil procedure and the 
legal profession; and ultimately the limits of the demands of justice 
under the rule oflaw. 
